Russia-Eurasia

In the past decade Russia set a strategic goal: to develop the Eastern vector of its energy policy and strengthen oil and gas cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries. While dialogue on gas with China was stalled, Rosneft, the country's number-one oil company, made a breakthrough in petroleum relations. 

Consistent attempts by the US and NATO to cooperate on ballistic missile defenses have long divided Russia and the West. The failed talks on this issue have built a foundation of frustration that has reinforced the general lack of trust among the parties on this issue.

The crisis in the North Caucasus has had a negative impact across all of Russia. 

As China's role in shaping the world grows, Russia is increasingly unable to resist its neighbor's economic and political influence. As a result, Russia's China discourse has evolved from the one dominated by Westernizers to one largely controlled by Sinophiles. The latter favor development of relations with China based on Russia's economic and security priorities. Although the official discourse remains focused on strengthening ties with Europe, the state is increasingly subject to pressures by various groups, both inside and outside state structures, with preferences for China. For the Western world, the prospect of the growing "Sinophilization" of Russia's foreign policy implies the need to strengthen ties with Russia, while preserving the existing level of strong relations with China.

After the European Union's intervention in the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the EU has stepped up the visibility of its involvement in the South Caucasian state. Its political, economic and manpower engagement is now vital to the country's prosperity and stability. The Eastern Partnership, launched in May 2009, is a further signal of the EU's commitment to the countries on its Eastern borders. However, the new initiative is insufficient to tackle the roots of Georgia's secessionist problems. Indeed, these prove to be more complicated than the Russia vs. Georgia conception that Tbilisi subscribes to. The Union needs to establish a genuine conflict policy to complement the bilateral and multilateral framework of the EaP. Furthermore, the Union's member states need to apply themselves to the EaP's elaboration in order to ensure the project's success; otherwise it risks becoming an empty gesture rather than a viable tool for the development of the EU's partners in the region.

Russie.Nei.Visions is a digital collection of policy papers published in French, English, and Russian by the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri.

Russia's military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 sent a shock wave across the post-Soviet space, particularly the republics to the west and south of Russia. In December 2008, the European Union formalized the Eastern Partnership initiative, directed at Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In order to understand the impact of this war both on Russia's bilateral relations with these countries and on the Eastern Partnership area as a whole, this article analyzes the reactions of these former Soviet republics to the Russian offensive. Three types of response are observed: keeping distance from Russia; maintaining a balance between Moscow and the West; and, finally, changing course (from rapprochement to keeping a distance and vice-versa) vis-à-vis the former center of the Soviet Empire.

The 2008 war in Georgia is but a milestone on the downward curve in NATO-Russia relations, one that has been characterized by misunderstandings, misplaced expectations and missed opportunities. This is not a new Cold War, but there is an obvious need for new ideas rather than repackaged old ones. NATO has to be sensitive to genuine Russian security concerns, and the latter should appreciate that manipulation, intimidation and attempts at dividing the Alliance are not shortcuts to superpower restoration. There is ample room for cooperation if the right lessons are learned, the gap between rhetoric and reality is reduced, and policies are governed by patience and pragmatism.

China has become an important provider of development assistance (through grants and soft loans) to Central Asian states. The focus of this study is the two states of the region most in need of aid: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The paper discusses the characteristics of Chinese assistance, comparing its activities and policies in Central Asia with those in Africa, and draws conclusions about the implications of such growing engagement. Given the European Union's declared interest in the region, notably through its Strategy for Central Asia adopted in 2007, the opportunity is taken to suggest ways in which China's growing development role should be understood in Brussels.

The report is based on research trips to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in June-August 2008 supported by a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is part of the Regional Competence-Building for Think Tanks project in the South Caucasus and Central Asia organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.