Les armées françaises face aux menaces anti-aériennes de nouvelle génération
Although it had never entirely disappeared, the surface-to-air threat was mitigated for three decades by Western air superiority. It now benefits from a modernization and dissemination momentum that will increasingly hinder expeditionary forces’ freedom of action.
Taking advantage of the information technology revolution, the new surface-air missiles (SAM) systems are more effective and resilient than their predecessors. The emergence of new export actors specialized in inexpensive products or in old systems reconditioning contributes as well to the diffusion of the threat. However, this trend is also bolstered by the chronic disinvestment of Europeans armed forces in suppression of enemy air defenses. In order to preserve its ability to perform “entry operations”, France must acknowledge the limits of its current model and act accordingly in its capability development policy.
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Jean-Christophe NOËL
Associate Research Fellow, Security Studies Center, Ifri
Morgan PAGLIA
Former Research Fellow, Security Studies Center
Élie TENENBAUM
Director of Ifri’s Security Studies Center
Security Studies Center
Heir to a tradition dating back to the founding of Ifri, the Security Studies Center provides public and private decision-makers as well as the general public with the keys to understanding power relations and contemporary modes of conflict as well as those to come. Through its positioning at the juncture of politics and operations, the credibility of its civil-military team and the wide distribution of its publications in French and English, the Center for Security Studies constitutes in the French landscape of think tanks a unique center of research and influence on the national and international defense debate.
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