Les armées françaises face aux menaces anti-aériennes de nouvelle génération
Although it had never entirely disappeared, the surface-to-air threat was mitigated for three decades by Western air superiority. It now benefits from a modernization and dissemination momentum that will increasingly hinder expeditionary forces’ freedom of action.
Taking advantage of the information technology revolution, the new surface-air missiles (SAM) systems are more effective and resilient than their predecessors. The emergence of new export actors specialized in inexpensive products or in old systems reconditioning contributes as well to the diffusion of the threat. However, this trend is also bolstered by the chronic disinvestment of Europeans armed forces in suppression of enemy air defenses. In order to preserve its ability to perform “entry operations”, France must acknowledge the limits of its current model and act accordingly in its capability development policy.
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