The recent developments of Russian and Chinese air power challenge the West’s ability to acquire air superiority, particularly in the field of integrated air defense systems. The proliferation of ballistic and hypersonic technologies, drones, access to advanced electronic warfare technology, and the emerging exploitation of very high altitudes are potential game changers that might bypass or undermine the traditional Western paradigm of air dominance.

Radar stealth and the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) are likely to remain the dominant factors of tactical superiority in air combat over the next decade. In addition, any force structure that will have switched from a platform-centric mindset to saturation and distribution strategies, while mastering a certain number of associated technologies, will gain a decisive edge in the battlespace.

The French air power is built around two main missions: nuclear deterrence and the air defense of mainland France. It is reaching the limits of its ability to weigh decisively within large coalitions fighting in high-intensity conflicts, due mostly to the absence of stealth platforms and SEAD capabilities, as well as to its undersized fleet of combat aircraft, lack of mission systems, and insufficient ammunition stockpiles.

This study lists several recommendations, broadly aiming at: 

• maintaining the short- and medium-term relevance of the current fleet of combat aircraft by modernizing their mission systems and increasing weapons stockpiles;
• moving from a platform-centric approach to a network of distributed sensors and weapons working together to regain a form of mass;   
• in the medium term, freeing fighter aviation from the Augustinian cost spiral, by ensuring the cost-effectiveness of its exquisite capabilities and employing them only where they are needed, while building a high-low mix of differentiated stand-in and standoff platforms.