Opérations basées sur les effets : rationalité et réalité
Apparue aux États Unis dans l'euphorie de l'éclatante victoire aéroterrestre de la première guerre du Golfe en 1991, l'idée de concevoir les opérations à partir des effets que l'on souhaite obtenir sur le terrain et l'ennemi reprend une notion qui n'a rien de révolutionnaire. Il ne s'agit pas d'une nouvelle manière de faire la guerre. Les principes en question, comme le fait de faire plier la volonté de l'adversaire, rappellent Clausewitz ou Sun Tsu. Néanmoins, cette notion prend une toute autre dimension avec les développements conceptuels et doctrinaux de la théorie des Effects-Based Operations.
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Opérations basées sur les effets : rationalité et réalité
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