The concept of strategic surprise has rarely been defined precisely and generally conveys the idea of a badly or non-anticipated threat which unexpectedly hits a state, shaking its conceptions and its position towards security. Until the 1980s strategic surprise would take the form of a nuclear surprise attack. In the 1990s, the idea of a so-called "computer Pearl Harbor" was put forward, which would neutralize the complex systems supporting western societies. With the 9/11 attacks, the threat of a strategic surprise suddenly materialized. After delineating the legitimate scope of the notion of "strategic surprise", highlighting the variability of its effects and underlining the importance of the "target" and of its vulnerability, this paper aims exploring some possible trails and answers, which would attempt to reduce not only the probability of an attack but also its impact.

From Afghanistan to the Central African Republic, through Haiti and Guinea Bissau, 'failed' or fragile states have finally turned out to be much more resilient than planned to the Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and other imported reforms of governance. Their ability to let any reform coming from abroad sink, to block or twist such initiatives strongly contrasts with the weakness of their human and financial resources. The example of the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates the difficulties which are inherent to the concept of SSR.

In Europe and to a lesser extent in the rest of the world, the last decades have been characterized by two concomitant phenomena : the increasing cost of armament technology which has become always more sophisticated as well as the reduction in the strength of national armed forces and in their budget. In that context of restrictions, the implementation of armament programs in a strictly national framework appears to be more and more problematic. Resorting to co-operation and harmonizing the needs of the different armed forces turns out to be a "pressing necessity" or at least a pragmatic solution to many recurring difficulties.

Development aid has progressively penetrated the fields of conflicts and "fragility". It tends to become a key component of external interventions, next to military action and diplomacy. As a result, it is subjected to the final goals of those operations which, beyond the end of confrontations and the setting up of a political solution, aim at building peace.

What is the role of terror in wars in general and in asymmetric conflicts in particular? Why have democratic countries such as France and the United States been confronted to torture in Algeria and Irak? Do terrorists have to be "terrorized"? That article aims at exploring some lines of enquiry in order to answer those particularly sensitive issues.

Birthing Athena. The Uncertain Future of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)