Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The "Al-Qaedaization" of Uzbek Jihadism
The goal of this paper is to analyze the threat of Islamist terrorism in Central Asia, through analysis of what could be termed a real Al Qaeda-like threat: the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and its splinter cells, which seem to be the real problem in Central Asia.
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The "Al-Qaedaization" of Uzbek Jihadism
Author(s)
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programs
Russia/Eurasia Center
Founded in 2005 within Ifri, the Russia/Eurasia Center conducts research and organizes debates on Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. Its goal is to understand and anticipate the evolution of this complex and rapidly changing geographical area in order to enrich public discourse in France and Europe and to assist in strategic, political, and economic decision-making.
Find out more
Discover all our analyses
The Contradictory Impacts of Western Sanctions on Economic Relations between Russia and Sub-Saharan Africa
How does Russia maintain economic ties with Africa despite Western sanctions? An analysis of investments, trade, and the circumvention strategies deployed by Moscow.
The Caspian Sea as an Emerging Energy Hub : Potentials and Limitations
This report analyzes the prospects of the Caspian Sea region — and its key actors except for Russia and Iran — becoming an important energy hub serving the needs of the European Union (EU).
The European Union's Strategic Test in Georgia
The political crisis brewing in Georgia is of an existential nature for the country. What is at stake is Georgia's future as a democratic and sovereign European nation (EU).
Commanders of Putin's Long War: Purged, Reshuffled and Disgruntled
The trend of reshuffling the Russian top military command in the course of a fast-evolving and far from successful war has progressed unevenly both across the Armed Forces’ structures and in time. The rationale for and timing of the abrupt cadre decisions made by Commander-in-Chief Putin often defy logical explanation, and the rare official clarifications are no more informative than the usual information blackout.