Russia and Gazprom's natural gas strategies on the European market are the result of the uncertainties (volumes, prices) created by the liberalization of the EU natural gas market. The company's policy of asset acquisition, begun at the end of the 1990s, the multiplication of export networks, as well as the desire to preserve long-term contracts while benefiting from new contractual opportunities are all clear illustrations of this strategy. Yet the industrial and commercial strategies that Gazprom may develop cannot discount geopolitical issues. Therefore, Vladimir Putin's desire to place hydrocarbons at the service of his economic and foreign policies, notably by making use of large, internationalized companies owned primarily by the state, remains in the background.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Norway embarked on a policy to overcome old dividing lines in the High North and encourage closer cooperation with Russia, its large neighbor to the east. In addition to being neighbors in the High North - an area that still plays an important part in Russian strategic designs - both countries are important global energy players and share interests in developing energy resources in the area. However, their energy cooperation is influenced by many historical and geopolitical factors and concerns, and their bilateral relationship is strongly influenced by a visible disparity of their respective potentials and by their historically determined perceptions of each other. To what extent their cooperation in the energy sphere will be influenced by these perceptions, and to what extent their energy related interests overlap or collide are a few of the questions addressed in this brief analysis of the developing Russian-Norwegian energy relationship, particularly in light of Gazprom's decision to invite StatoilHydro to join the Shtokman gas field project.

Russia is an unavoidable actor in world energy geopolitics. It is also the biggest energy partner of a European Union (EU) that is becoming ever more dependent on outside sources for its energy needs. However, the future of Russia's largest company-Gazprom-and the development of its future production capacities are at the center of a complex financial and political game dominated by numerous uncertainties, including Gazprom's actual reserves, its ability to invest in exploration and production, and its very capacity to develop production. Indeed, back in state hands, Russian gas and oil companies-Gazprom included-do not appear to be in a position to meet their future production commitments. Gazprom's ability to honor its contracts with gas companies in the EU is in fact already the subject of numerous interrogations.

Since the mid-1990s, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been an important factor in, and exerts significant influence on both Kazakhstan's international situation and geopolitical processes in Central Asia. Various aspects of Kazakhstan's interests are included in the SCO, among them geopolitics, security, the economy and regional politics. The topics addressed by the SCO can be divided into wide-ranging and often unconnected problems, which are more often than not solved outside the framework of the SCO. In the end, the SCO is only a great 'geopolitical bluff.' And while the USA seems to be almost an 'unofficial partner' because it so influences Central Asia as a whole, the European Union has almost entirely withdrawn from that geopolitical scene. As yet, the SCO poses more challenges and risks for Kazakhstan than it offers advantages.

While the EU conceives its neighborhood via regional policies, Russia sees it in terms of geopolitics. A large part of the misunderstanding which prevails on both sides concerning the 'Common Space for External Security' stems from the clash between these different mental maps. By examining the respective and reciprocal implications of these approaches, this paper underlines the need for both parties to become conscious of the conceptual gap between their viewpoints, and to try ultimately reducing it.

Since 2003 and after centuries of geopolitical competition, Russia and Turkey have drawn together in a new bilateral relationship. Expanding trade has been a major driving force behind this, but shared disillusionment with United States and European policies and attitudes, as well as increasing common ground on issues in the broader Black Sea region and further afield in the Middle East, have all played a role. At this juncture, the main impact of this new relationship is in Russia and Turkey's joint border area of the South Caucasus - with potentially negative implications for the fragile state of Georgia and for the European Union's new 'Neighborhood Policy' in the region.