Toujours plus chers ? Complexité des armements et inflation des coûts militaires
While French military expenditures have remained relatively constant over the last ten years, equipment production tended to decrease, resulting in capability gaps. This situation highlights the increasing costs of both acquiring and maintaining highly complex modern military equipment.
By decomposing the cost factors, this paper contends that technical complexity is one of the most prominent causes of “military inflation” - albeit by no means the only one - in the production as well as in the support phase. While efforts to reduce costs have focused on organizational issues, uncertainty over the conditions of future warfare compels actors to produce high-tech and multi-purpose material, at the risk of exceeding operational requirements. For this reason, it is necessary to define more clearly the military’s expectations so that technical complexity matches operational sufficiency.
This study is in French only: Toujours plus chers ? Complexité des armements et inflation des coûts militaires
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