The War on Terrorism: Global Experts Reflect on Lessons Learned Twenty-Five Years After 9/11

Twenty years ago, in 2006, the French government published a white paper on homeland security in the face of terrorism. One section of the document explained why France rejected the American concept of the “global war on terror,” even though French troops had been deployed to Afghanistan as early as 2001 as part of the U.S.-led military coalition. The primary reason for this explanation was legal: in France, a declaration of war can trigger emergency legislation that may endanger democracy by concentrating power in the hands of the president. But the rationale was also strategic. To the extent that nationals of Western countries join jihadi groups, recognizing a state of war could put countries on the slippery slope toward civil war. 

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Assessing Terrorist Threats With Objectivity and Nuance 

Twenty years ago, in 2006, the French government published a white paper on homeland security in the face of terrorism. One section of the document explained why France rejected the American concept of the “global war on terror,” even though French troops had been deployed to Afghanistan as early as 2001 as part of the U.S.-led military coalition. The primary reason for this explanation was legal: in France, a declaration of war can trigger emergency legislation that may endanger democracy by concentrating power in the hands of the president. But the rationale was also strategic. To the extent that nationals of Western countries join jihadi groups, recognizing a state of war could put countries on the slippery slope toward civil war.

Yet ten years after that publication, the term “war” had become widely used across the French political class. During that period, France deployed its armed forces in Operation Serval (later Operation Barkhane) in the Sahel, joined the international coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and launched Operation Sentinelle on French territory following the terrorist attacks of January 2015.

Today, the terrorist threat has evolved, but it is still regarded by the French authorities as highly dangerous. The 2025 National Strategic Review devotes significant attention to terrorism, even though, since 2022, the predominant threat has been Russia and the return of interstate warfare to European soil.

If there is one lesson to be drawn from this decades-long war that began on September 11, 2001, it is the need to identify the terrorist threat with objectivity and nuance. Underestimating the threat can lead to a form of blindness that paves the way for tragic attacks. Conversely, exaggerating the threat can trigger an overreaction that risks creating a vicious cycle beneficial to terrorists. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which France refused to join, is a case in point.

The risk of underestimation or overreaction stems from the inherent difficulty of assessing the capabilities of groups operating clandestinely, but it may also result from political or ideological bias. It is rather striking that the 2026 United States Counterterrorism Strategy completely sidesteps far-right white supremacist extremism, which was considered a significant threat during the Biden administration. When politics contaminates threat assessments, it bodes ill for what lies ahead. 

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Read the full article on the Council of Foreign Relation's website.