The European Union’s hydrocarbon energy supply depends heavily on imports. While the European Commission has recommended diversifying and increasing domestic resources, notably with renewable resources which should grow to 20% by 2020, dependence on hydrocarbon imports will remain not only substantial, but will increase.

At the end of the Copenhagen Conference of December 2009, the attending parties failed to agree on a legally binding commitment, but ultimately signed the Copenhagen Accord. The countries signing this accord took different engagements in respect to their economic and emissions status. 

Last week the gritty Russian/Ukrainian gas relationship was back in the press. This time the issue appeared to be Ukraine’s efforts to secure lower prices for its consumers - perhaps even on a par with Russia’s domestic consumers. The Ukrainians must surely know that to qualify for those kinds of special prices available previously only to politically compliant neighbors - Ukraine would have to return to some form of pre-Orange Revolution relationship with Mother Russia.

There is a valuable lesson to be learned about raw material dependence from the tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea. It’s not about the oil and gas that is thought to be stored under the seabed in disputed waters, but rather the so-called “rare earth elements”, of which China produces 97% of the global supply.

The package of the Azeri-Turkish gas agreements signed in Istanbul on June 7, 2010, in the presence of President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Recep Erdogan certainly makes cooperation easier in a sector which both parties consider to be strategic. It does not, however, specify all details of the sale and transit of gas (see e.g. EurasiaNet, 7 June). The documents above all have important political significance.