France’s “Return” to NATO: An Inopportune Decision
The French decision to re-enter NATO’s integrated military structure is merely the confirmation of a series of shifts that started a long time ago. But it is no less questionable a decision. It is a symbolic decision that affects France’s image internationally. It by no means guarantees that the Alliance will evolve in a way that corresponds to France’s national interests; nor does it shed light on France’s ambiguous future. It does, however, in a very real way, risk diminishing France’s will to defend itself.
The decision of French President Sarkozy that France re-enter NATO’s integrated military structure is, as his supporters have pointed out, the confirmation of a series of earlier shifts. The validity of these changes was debatable at the time, but they are now a fixture of the French political landscape.
Indeed, France played a part in NATO’s survival after the Cold War by agreeing to an intervention in 1994-1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, later, in 1999 – this time without a UN mandate – in Kosovo and more generally in Yugoslavia. As early as December 1995, France re-entered NATO’s Military Committee. France had agreed to intervene outside its original sphere of influence.
At the beginning, the Atlantic Alliance, of which France never ceased to be a part, was a defensive alliance, restricted to the Euro-Atlantic zone. Over the years, and particularly since 1999 (Kosovo) and 2001 (Afghanistan), it has become a global alliance committed to stabilization and peace-enforcement operations. This is effectively a shift in the organization’s stated purpose. NATO is now portrayed as ‘the UN’s military arm,’ yet this has not always been the case. During the Kosovo conflict, NATO bombed Yugoslavian cities, supplanting the UN whose Security Council had not issued a mandate for intervention. We can only hope that this regrettable situation will not be repeated. It is worth noting, however, that the manner in which the Kosovo conflict was dealt with set a precedent that led to the invasion of Iraq by a ‘coalition of volunteers’ led by the United States and, for the most part, recent or older members of NATO. In opposing the invasion of Iraq, France was a minority within the United States-dominated organization, as well as within the European Union.
Furthermore, France has now become one of the main contributors to NATO’s ‘stabilization operations.’ As such, was it necessary to take things further by re-entering NATO’s Defense Planning Committee (DPC) as well as its Chief of Staff ranks? In other words, France is once again a part of NATO’s integrated military structure, which remains, from an operational point of view, under the supreme command of an American general. Justifying this decision is no small task because it is a political and symbolic decision whose importance should by no means be played down.
What are France and NATO’s common interests?
The expected benefits do not, in my view, outweigh the disadvantages that this decision involves. The French President’s justification (“We are a part of the Western family”) can only be the result of a hasty assessment. The decline of the American superpower is indeed on the cards. The United States is living beyond its means. […]
Outline
- What are France and NATO’s common interests?
- Current challenges facing the Alliance
- Is this decision putting France in danger?
Jean-Pierre Chevènement holds the title of Honorary Member of Parliament and was previously a Minister.
This paper is translated in English by Clémence Sébag.
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France’s “Return” to NATO: An Inopportune Decision
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Text published in Politique étrangère, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2026.
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