Since 1991, the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation has been the main barometer of Russo-Western relations. During the Cold War, the Alliance served primarily to deal with the ‘German question’ and to ward off the ‘Soviet threat.’ Following German reunification and the disappearance of the Soviet bloc, NATO lost a priori its justification. But the Alliance managed to transform itself by redefining its missions and making enlargement its new raison d’être . During the Clinton years, Washington used the Alliance as an instrument for the democratization, reunification and stabilization of Europe, as Russia’s geopolitical status declined. The view from Moscow was that this policy deliberately ignored Russia’s interests. Now, Russia’s resurgence is changing the balance of power, in the wake of transatlantic differences over Iraq and as the NATO countries are bogged down in Afghanistan. This renewed influence is variously interpreted in Washington, and hence within the Alliance. It is obliging the Americans and the Europeans to reconsider the strategic framework in which they view the ‘Russian question,’ while the US/Europe/Russia triangle has not yet stabilized. In this perspective, it can be said that Kabul and Tehran are much more important than Kyiv and Tbilisi for the future of NATO.

The causes of misunderstanding

Three fractures: 1999, 1997 and 2004

The campaign in Kosovo in 1999 is generally held to be the turning-point in Russo-Western relations. This fracture is most often explained by Russia’s feeling of military decline, with the Pristina episode being interpreted as an illustration of Russia’s capacity to make trouble. This campaign did not just hurt NATO’s image in Russia, but also in Belarus and Ukraine. For Moscow, the lesson was threefold and contributed to explaining its subsequent inflexibility.

First, for Vladimir Putin, Kosovo revealed the necessity of reconsidering Russia’s security policy. The Russian elites became aware of their strategic marginalization, leading to a strong feeling of humiliation and great resentment. Subsequently, this was often exaggerated. Nevertheless, this is all that NATO understood, exaggerating its own politico-military potential and downplaying the strictly Russian aspect of the issue. […]

OUTLINE

• The causes of misunderstanding
  - Three fractures: 1999, 1997 and 2004
  - The grandeur and misery of public diplomacy
  - Confrontations and lessons
• Outline of the ‘Russian Question’
  - Russia as a source of security or insecurity
  - European security at the heart of the US/Europe/Russia triangle
  - The US/Europe/Russian triangle at the center of world security

Thomas Gomart is Director of the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri).

This paper has been translated into English by Nicholas Sowels.