EU-Mercosur: An Unsolvable Trilemma Between Competition Rules, Normative Ambitions and Supply Chain Diversification
The EU-Mercosur trade deal was believed to be heading toward the finish. The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as the president of Brazil, as successor to the right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro, and the Spanish presidency of the European Union (EU), raised hopes for its conclusion. But the reservations expressed by several EU member states and some Latin American countries have dashed hopes.
Lula wants to conclude the agreement before the end of Brazil's Mercosur presidency. Supporters believe that this window of opportunity should be taken advantage of. But the EU's insistence on compliance with environmental standards as a condition for concluding the agreement has met with little enthusiasm in the Latin American partner states. This raises the question of whether the EU-Mercosur trade agreement negotiated in 2019 still meets the parties' expectations. Faced with a fragmented international community, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, and growing Sino-American rivalry, the EU is looking for new trading partners with whom it shares the same values.
These agreements also echo the EU's economic security strategy presented by Ursula von der Leyen in June 2023, which emphasizes security of supply and diversification. In addition to strengthening its supply chains and reducing its dependence on the critical raw materials needed for the EU’s green transition, the EU hopes to further political cohesion with Latin America through the EU-Mercosur agreements. But there is disagreement in the EU about the EU-Mercosur trade deal: Some member states fear disadvantages for domestic agriculture. But the Mercosur countries are also increasingly demanding and threaten to turn toward China which promises to increase investment and develop trade relations with the region.
Marie Krpata is a Fellow Researcher at the Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri).
Ana Helena Palermo is a consultant to the President of the ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung.
This publication is available in French and German (pdf):
GERMAN: "EU-Mercosur: Ein unlösbares Trilemma zwischen Wettbewerbsregeln, normativen Ambitionen und der Diversifizierung der Lieferketten".
>> >> See on the same topic: Klemens Kober "Towards a New European Trade Strategy in Times of Geopolitical Upheaval: The German Perspective" , Notes du Cerfa, No. 176, Ifri, October 2023 (pdf).
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Marie KRPATA
Research Fellow, Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa), Ifri
The Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa)
The Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) was created in 1954 by an inter-governmental agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and France, in order to raise awareness of Germany in France and analyze Franco-German relations, including in their European and international dimensions. In its conferences and seminars, which bring together experts, political leaders, senior decision-makers and representatives of civil society from both countries, Cerfa develops the Franco-German debate and stimulates political proposals. It regularly publishes studies through two collections: Cerfa notes and studies as well as Franco-German visions.
Cerfa maintains close relations with the network of German foundations and think tanks. In addition to its research and debate activities, Cerfa promotes the emergence of a new Franco-German generation through original cooperation programs. This is how in 2021-2022, Cerfa led a program on multilateralism with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Paris. This program is aimed at young professionals from both countries interested in the issues of multilateralism in the context of their activities. It covered a wide range of themes relating to multilateralism, such as international trade, health, human rights and migration, non-proliferation and disarmament. Previously, Cerfa had participated in the Franco-German future dialogue, co-led with the DGAP from 2007 to 2020, and supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation and the Daniel Vernet group (formerly the Franco-German Reflection Group) which was founded in 2014 upon the initiative of the Genshagen Foundation.
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