The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Beyond Donald Trump: Mapping the American Stakeholders of U.S.-Taiwan Relations
Donald Trump’s return to the White House reintroduced acute uncertainty into the security commitment of the United States (U.S.) to Taiwan. Unlike President Joe Biden, who repeatedly stated the determination to defend Taiwan, President Trump refrains from commenting on the hypothetical U.S. response in the context of a cross-Strait crisis.
Titre
Key takeways
Over the past year, the Trump 2 administration brought back uncertainty and volatility in U.S. foreign policy, including vis-à-vis China and Taiwan. Trump has used harsh language about Taiwan and often seems to prioritize a trade deal with Beijing over Taiwan’s security.
Yet unpacking the U.S. policy toward Taiwan reveals that Donald Trump is not the only stakeholder. First, besides the president, government agencies have proved consistent in sustaining political and military cooperation with Taiwan.
Congress remains the most reliable institution upholding closer cooperation with Taiwan, advancing bipartisan laws that expand defense, energy, and space cooperation.
The American tech giants have expanded investments in Taiwan’s semiconductor, AI, and cloud ecosystem, embedding U.S. technological competitiveness in Taiwan.
Ultimately, whether Donald Trump is genuinely interested in Taiwan’s security or not, there are heavy counterweights in the U.S. and a wide consensus in Congress and industry in support of Taiwan.
Trump's only comments—very debatable and largely unfounded—have consisted of assessing that “China doesn’t want to do that [i.e., invade Taiwan]”, and quoting Xi Jinping during a phone call as saying, for instance: “He told me, ‘I will never do it as long as you’re president’.” In addition, he has harshly criticized Taiwan for “stealing” the American semiconductor industry, and pressured Taiwanese industries to invest ever more in the U.S. While there is no evidence of Trump’s intention to abandon Taiwan, or bargaining it away for a trade deal with Beijing as some have anticipated, the question of whether the U.S. would intervene if Beijing attempted forcible unification with Taiwan looms larger than at any point in the recent decades.
Yet, focusing exclusively on presidential rhetoric risks overlooking the deeper structural forces shaping U.S.-Taiwan relations. The U.S. policy toward Taiwan is sustained not only by the president but also by a wider, more complex system of stakeholders, including executive agencies, Congress, as well as the American industrial technological base. This Memo aims to make sense of the U.S. policy on Taiwan by mapping these different stakeholders and drawing perspectives on the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations under Trump.
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The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Beyond Donald Trump: Mapping the American Stakeholders of U.S.-Taiwan Relations
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