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The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Beyond Donald Trump: Mapping the American Stakeholders of U.S.-Taiwan Relations

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Donald Trump’s return to the White House reintroduced acute uncertainty into the security commitment of the United States (U.S.) to Taiwan. Unlike President Joe Biden, who repeatedly stated the determination to defend Taiwan, President Trump refrains from commenting on the hypothetical U.S. response in the context of a cross-Strait crisis.

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Taiwanese and American flags displayed together at an Asian alliance festival
Taiwanese and American flags displayed together at an Asian alliance festival (Honolulu, HI – January 25, 2025)
John Hanson Pye/Shutterstock.com
Table of contents
Table of contents

Titre
Key takeways

1
Policy uncertainty and volatility
Texte courant

Over the past year, the Trump 2 administration brought back uncertainty and volatility in U.S. foreign policy, including vis-à-vis China and Taiwan. Trump has used harsh language about Taiwan and often seems to prioritize a trade deal with Beijing over Taiwan’s security.

2
The role of government agencies
Texte courant

Yet unpacking the U.S. policy toward Taiwan reveals that Donald Trump is not the only stakeholder. First, besides the president, government agencies have proved consistent in sustaining political and military cooperation with Taiwan.

3
The role of Congress
Texte courant

Congress remains the most reliable institution upholding closer cooperation with Taiwan, advancing bipartisan laws that expand defense, energy, and space cooperation.

4
American tech companies
Texte courant

The American tech giants have expanded investments in Taiwan’s semiconductor, AI, and cloud ecosystem, embedding U.S. technological competitiveness in Taiwan.

5
A broad consensus in support of Taiwan
Texte courant

Ultimately, whether Donald Trump is genuinely interested in Taiwan’s security or not, there are heavy counterweights in the U.S. and a wide consensus in Congress and industry in support of Taiwan.

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Trump's only comments—very debatable and largely unfounded—have consisted of assessing that “China doesn’t want to do that [i.e., invade Taiwan]”, and quoting Xi Jinping during a phone call as saying, for instance: “He told me, ‘I will never do it as long as you’re president’.” In addition, he has harshly criticized Taiwan for “stealing” the American semiconductor industry, and pressured Taiwanese industries to invest ever more in the U.S. While there is no evidence of Trump’s intention to abandon Taiwan, or bargaining it away for a trade deal with Beijing as some have anticipated, the question of whether the U.S. would intervene if Beijing attempted forcible unification with Taiwan looms larger than at any point in the recent decades.

Yet, focusing exclusively on presidential rhetoric risks overlooking the deeper structural forces shaping U.S.-Taiwan relations. The U.S. policy toward Taiwan is sustained not only by the president but also by a wider, more complex system of stakeholders, including executive agencies, Congress, as well as the American industrial technological base. This Memo aims to make sense of the U.S. policy on Taiwan by mapping these different stakeholders and drawing perspectives on the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations under Trump.

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The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Beyond Donald Trump: Mapping the American Stakeholders of U.S.-Taiwan Relations

Decoration
Author(s)
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Marc JULIENNE

Marc JULIENNE

Intitulé du poste

Director, Center for Asian Studies, Ifri

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Asia Map
Center for Asian Studies
Accroche centre

Asia is a nerve center for multiple global economic, political and security challenges. The Center for Asian Studies provides documented expertise and a platform for discussion on Asian issues to accompany decision makers and explain and contextualize developments in the region for the sake of a larger public dialogue.

The Center's research is organized along two major axes: relations between Asia's major powers and the rest of the world; and internal economic and social dynamics of Asian countries. The Center's research focuses primarily on China, Japan, India, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, but also covers Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula and the Pacific Islands. 

The Centre for Asian Studies maintains close institutional links with counterpart research institutes in Europe and Asia, and its researchers regularly carry out fieldwork in the region.

The Center organizes closed-door roundtables, expert-level seminars and a number of public events, including an Annual Conference, that welcome experts from Asia, Europe and the United States. The work of Center’s researchers, as well as that of their partners, is regularly published in the Center’s electronic journal Asie.Visions.

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Date de publication
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Accroche

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Date de publication
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China’s EV Rise and the Strategic Challenge for Japan’s Automotive Industry

Date de publication
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Accroche

China’s rapid expansion in electric vehicle production is reshaping global automotive competition for both European and Japanese automakers. Japan —a pioneer in hybrid vehicles— is struggling to translate this leadership into battery electric vehicles (BEVs), as Chinese manufacturers rapidly scale production and exports. At the same time, China’s dominance in battery manufacturing and critical mineral processing exposes upstream vulnerabilities for Japan’s automotive industry. Together, these developments create a dual challenge: intensifying downstream competition in electric vehicle (EV) markets and continued dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains.

Aya ADACHI
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Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. A Stress Test for Taiwan with Global Implications

Date de publication
17 April 2026
Accroche

The large-scale military operation carried out by the United States (US) and Israel against Iran triggered an Iranian retaliation that resulted in the partial destruction of natural gas liquefaction infrastructure and severe disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The economies of East Asia—South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in particular—are highly exposed to this crisis due to their reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports for electricity generation.

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Taiwanese and American flags displayed together at an Asian alliance festival (Honolulu, HI – January 25, 2025)
John Hanson Pye/Shutterstock.com

How can this study be cited?

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Marc JULIENNE, Peter CHU, « The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Beyond Donald Trump: Mapping the American Stakeholders of U.S.-Taiwan Relations », Memos, Ifri, 17 February 2026.
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The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Beyond Donald Trump: Mapping the American Stakeholders of U.S.-Taiwan Relations