Japan’s Takaichi Landslide: A New Face of Power
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has turned her exceptional popularity into a historic political victory. The snap elections of February 8 delivered an overwhelming majority for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), driven by strong support from young voters, drawn to her iconoclastic and dynamic image, and from conservative voters reassured by her vision of national assertiveness. This popularity lays the foundation for an ambitious strategy on both the domestic and international fronts.
On the diplomatic front, Takaichi has adopted a firm stance toward China, warning of the risk of a blockade of the Taiwan Strait and resisting Beijing’s economic and diplomatic pressure. At the same time, she is consolidating the alliance with the United States under the second Trump administration by deepening military and economic integration, while diversifying Japan’s strategic partnerships to guard against the risks of excessive dependence.
Security and defense lie at the core of her strategy. Defense spending is set to rise to 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) as early as 2026 and expand further; constitutional and legal constraints on arms exports and the hosting of nuclear-related capabilities are to be eased; and the defense industry is being promoted as both a driver of growth and a lever of strategic autonomy. Together, these measures aim to strengthen deterrence and advance Japan’s military normalization.
Economically, Takaichi seeks to secure Japan’s autonomy and resilience by investing in strategic sectors such as semiconductors, aerospace, space, and defense, while also stimulating domestic consumption. Japan thus positions itself as a solid and reliable partner for France and Europe, capable of playing a central role in the Indo-Pacific and of contributing to a rebalancing of the international order in the face of regional and global hegemons.
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Japan’s Takaichi Landslide: A New Face of Power
Céline PAJON
Research Fellow, Head of Japan and Indo-Pacific Research, Center for Asian Studies, Ifri
Center for Asian Studies
Asia is a nerve center for multiple global economic, political and security challenges. The Center for Asian Studies provides documented expertise and a platform for discussion on Asian issues to accompany decision makers and explain and contextualize developments in the region for the sake of a larger public dialogue.
The Center's research is organized along two major axes: relations between Asia's major powers and the rest of the world; and internal economic and social dynamics of Asian countries. The Center's research focuses primarily on China, Japan, India, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, but also covers Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula and the Pacific Islands.
The Centre for Asian Studies maintains close institutional links with counterpart research institutes in Europe and Asia, and its researchers regularly carry out fieldwork in the region.
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