Deutsche Rußlandpolitik: Ende des „Schmusekurses
Doppelte Note du Cerfa, 26 (a) und 26 (b), September 2005, in Kooperation mit dem Programm Russland/GUS
Note du Cerfa, n° 26 (a), septembre 2005 Hannes Adomeit, "Deutsche Rußlandpolitik: Ende des „Schmusekurses?"
Note du Cerfa, n° 26 (b), septembre 2005 Andreï Zagorski, "Russland und Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel"
Die Entwicklungen in Putins Russland weg von Democratie und Rechtsstaat haben auch die deutsche Russlandpolitik auf den Prüfstand gestellt. So haben Repräsentanten der Oppositionsparteien CDU/SCU und FDP im Vorfelf der Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 18. September zu arkennen gegeben, dass sie die von Bundeskanzler Schröder gegenüber Russland eingenommene Haltung für verfehlt halten. In den neuen EU-Mitgliedstaaten Ostmitteleuropas wird Deutschland vorgeworfen, es schlage abweichend von der EU einen Sonderweg ein, es strebe ein Sonderverhältnis zu Russlan an. Der vorliegende Artikel geht der Frage nach, ob diese Kritik zutreffend ist und was hinter der von Bundeskanzler Schröder und Präsident Putin immer wieder beschworenen "strategischen Partnerschaft" steckt.
Hannes Adomeit is seit 1997 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter und Fachmann für Russlandfragen am Forschungsinstutut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit der SWP in Berlin.
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Deutsche Rußlandpolitik: Ende des „Schmusekurses
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analysesFrance-Germany: Overcoming Differences to Strengthen European Sovereignty
The Franco-German “reset” launched with Friedrich Merz’s appointment as Chancellor in May 2025 and given concrete form at the Franco-German Council of Ministers (FGCM) in Toulon in August 2025 was intended to address the structural challenges affecting the bilateral relationship. Yet it is clear that these ambitions have only been partially translated into concrete action. Since the beginning of 2026, Franco-German relations have entered a phase in which short-term challenges have combined with deeper divergences over priorities, policy approaches, and strategic culture.
Under construction: Europe’s economic repositioning in a fragmented international order
„Under Destruction“– this was this year’s motto at the Munich Security Conference. A motto that applies both to security and economy in an increasingly fragile international system. In 2024, Mario Draghi’s report on the EU’s competitiveness rang the alarm bell: Europe is slipping behind the US and China, European companies struggle with Brussels' bureaucracy, and the internal market is too fragmented. However, two years later only about 15 % of his recommendations were implemented: the wake-up call was not heard.
Germany in the Shadow of the United States, Russia, and China – Systemic Paradigm Shifts
Since reunification, Germany has built its prosperity on an international order based on free trade, multilateralism, and geopolitical stability. This model relied on three relationships considered complementary: U.S. military protection, Russian energy supplies, and economic integration with China. For several decades, Berlin viewed these interdependencies as factors contributing to peace, growth, and security.
France and EU Enlargement: From Strategic Hesitation to a Geopolitical Shift
Paris has come a long way in its approach to enlarging the European Union. However, French support remains fragile, due in part to a lack of public support.