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Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?

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French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?

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Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?
Paris, France - March 24, 2025: President Emmanuel Macron
Luca Perra / Shutterstock
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[...]

Héloïse Fayet, Research Fellow and Head of the Deterrence & Proliferation Research Program at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales

France’s new nuclear posture has been welcomed broadly across Europe—but it has also raised expectations.

Initial reactions show that Macron’s announcement has reassured many partners. European governments quoted in his March 2 speech issued positive and coordinated statements afterwards, signaling support for the president’s willingness to engage more openly on nuclear deterrence. Interest is emerging beyond the forward deterrence framework: Norway and Finland have indicated openness to closer dialogue with France, while Italian commentators complained about not being included in the initial discussions.

This is where the real test begins. Macron’s proposals, such as setting up nuclear steering groups with seven countries, in addition to the one that already exists between France and the UK, create momentum—but they also generate expectations. For these initiatives to matter, they will need to survive the end of Macron’s presidency and go beyond dialogues on threat assessment and doctrinal explanations. Joint exercises, scenario-based discussions, and transparency around vital interests are essential in creating a sense of shared destiny without altering the fundamentals of French sovereignty.

Finally, nuclear reassurance cannot compensate for Europe’s conventional weaknesses. Unless European countries strengthen their conventional deterrence, nuclear weapons alone will not be enough to sustain confidence.

[...]

> Read the full commentary on Carnegie's website.
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heloise fayet

Héloïse FAYET

Intitulé du poste

Research Fellow and Head of the Deterrence and Proliferation program, Security Studies Center, Ifri

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Nuclear ballistic missile submarine, in transit on the surface
Deterrence and Proliferation
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The conflicts in Europe, Asia and the Middle East demonstrate a return of nuclear power to the balance of power. Arsenals are being modernized and expanded, while arms control is collapsing. This research program aims to analyze these phenomena.

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 A soldier watching a sunset on an armored infantry fighting vehicle
Security Studies Center
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Heir to a tradition dating back to the founding of Ifri, the Security Studies Center provides public and private decision-makers as well as the general public with the keys to understanding power relations and contemporary modes of conflict as well as those to come. Through its positioning at the juncture of politics and operations, the credibility of its civil-military team and the wide distribution of its publications in French and English, the Center for Security Studies constitutes in the French landscape of think tanks a unique center of research and influence on the national and international defense debate.

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Macron Offers a Promising Vision for Nuclear Deterrence in Europe

Date de publication
11 March 2026
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Macron’s concept of ‘forward deterrence’ offers a distinctly European approach to nuclear deterrence.

Héloïse FAYET Darya DOLZIKOVA
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France has a new nuclear doctrine of ‘forward deterrence’ for Europe. What does it mean?

Date de publication
05 March 2026
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On Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech on France’s nuclear deterrence at the Île Longue naval base near Brest in Brittany, which hosts the country’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. Such addresses are a well-established presidential ritual, typically delivered once per presidential term and receiving moderate attention. This one, however, was highly anticipated in France and abroad, given the profound geopolitical shifts since Macron’s first nuclear speech in February 2020.

Mind the Deterrence Gap: Assessing Europe’s Nuclear Options

Date de publication
11 February 2026
Accroche

Europe must urgently confront a new nuclear reality. In recent years, Russia’s nuclear-backed revisionism has reintroduced nuclear coercion and the threat of nuclear escalation to the continent, underscoring the importance of credible nuclear deterrence. At the same time, Europe’s traditional reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence appears politically more fragile than at any point since the Cold War. Together, these developments require Europeans to think about their nuclear options.

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Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Temptations. Lessons Learned from Regional Instability

Date de publication
11 September 2025
Accroche

Saudi Arabia’s integration in the international arena and regional stability, notably through reducing its dependence on fossil energies, are crucial elements for the success of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, the Crown Prince’s top priority. However, Mohammed bin Salman’s declarations in 2018 and 2021, indicating that “if Iran develops a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible”, combined with the recent strikes on key Iranian nuclear facilities, do not bode well for the future of the Kingdom, the region and the non-proliferation regime at large.

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Paris, France - March 24, 2025: President Emmanuel Macron
Luca Perra / Shutterstock

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