Taking the Pulse: Can Europeans Build Their Independent Extended Nuclear Deterrent?
Confronted with a U.S. disengagement and the Russian threat, Europeans are reconsidering their stance on nuclear deterrence. Given the capabilities of the French and British arsenals, can Europe develop an independent nuclear deterrent?

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Héloïse Fayet , Research Fellow and Head of the Deterrence & Proliferation Research Program at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales
Forget the fantasy of a Eurobomb or a travelling nuclear suitcase between EU capitals. The real question is how to better leverage the existing arsenals of France and the UK in a Europe where Washington’s commitment is no longer a given. What happens if NATO allies can’t trust that the United States will trade Boston for Berlin?
The answer is not to mimic the American model with tactical nukes scattered across the continent. If Paris and London were to extend deterrence, it would be because their national security is inextricably tied to Europe’s stability. Any adaptation must reflect this.
For France, that could mean clarifying its vital interests and going beyond presidential speeches that require explaining to be correctly understood by allies—but without sharing nuclear decisionmaking or stationing warheads abroad. Those are currently a no-go for Paris. Conventional forces, missile defense, and deep precision strikes must also be part of the equation. Instead of obsessing over warhead numbers, why not start by reinforcing French deployments on NATO’s Eastern flank?
Even though the UK considers it already participates in European security through its nuclear contributions to NATO, London must American-proof its long-term nuclear future in case of diminished cooperation with the United States.
The time for pragmatic nuclear dialogue and political commitments is now.
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> Read the full commentary on Carnegie's website.
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