Technical Standards, Soft Connectivity and China’s Belt and Road: Towards greater convergence or fragmentation?
As the intensification of geopolitical competition points toward increased global fragmentation, the definition of technical standards for future markets and industries will play an important role in determining just how deep the fissures will run.
China has been a proactive contributor to the development of global standards via established international forums for more than a decade. Its participation has not been without friction, but nevertheless helps to ensure a meaningful level of technological and market convergence across the global economy.
Running in parallel to its engagement in global standards forums, China has multiplied its pathways of engagement in the field through bilateral and regional standards cooperation and “mutual recognition” agreements. Today, Beijing has concluded 108 such agreements with 65 national, regional and other institutional partners. Such developments have raised concerns about the potential for fragmentation of regional standards and the development of economic spheres of influence organized around competing technical standards regimes. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as a framework for concluding many of these agreements, but ultimately has little value as a platform for cooperation in and of itself. So far, on standardisation, the BRI is rather a patchwork of distinct bilateral, regional, and often sector-specific collaboration efforts between China and a diverse range of partners. Yet, as Beijing angles to present alternative pathways for global development, seeking to position itself as the voice of the Global South, outreach and technical assistance in areas such as standardisation have an important diplomatic role to play.
Yet the de-facto pathway to an internationalization of Chinese standards ultimately runs through concrete investments, wherein the “soft” connectivity of standards accompanies the “hard” connectivity of infrastructure and technology. Herein, Chinese firms play a vital role in carrying Chinese standards overseas, and while companies are increasingly central in defining China’s own national standards, they also have a keen interest in ensuring that their standards are compatible with global partners and competitors alike.
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Center for Asian Studies
Asia is a nerve center for multiple global economic, political and security challenges. The Center for Asian Studies provides documented expertise and a platform for discussion on Asian issues to accompany decision makers and explain and contextualize developments in the region for the sake of a larger public dialogue.
The Center's research is organized along two major axes: relations between Asia's major powers and the rest of the world; and internal economic and social dynamics of Asian countries. The Center's research focuses primarily on China, Japan, India, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, but also covers Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula and the Pacific Islands.
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