How the Russian Army Changed its Concept of War, 1993-2022
The traditional and high-intensity war that has occurred in Ukraine since Russia decided to invade raises a key issue: did post-soviet Russian strategic thought really prepare Russia for waging this war?
Une analyse des sources militaires russes montre que « l'opération militaire spéciale » n’aurait pas dû mener à une telle guerre. Bien au contraire, cette opération prenait place dans la théorisation russe post-soviétique sur le contournement de la lutte armée. Pour comprendre cette conception russe de la guerre et sa mise en œuvre sur le long terme en Ukraine, il est nécessaire d'analyser le principal débat militaire russe depuis 1993 : qu'est-ce que la guerre ?
Ce contenu est disponible en anglais sur le site de Taylor and Francis Online : How the Russian Army Changed its Concept of War, 1993-2022
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Dimitri MINIC
Research Fellow, Scientific Director of the Observatory on Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Ifri's Russia/Eurasia Center
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Founded in 2005 within Ifri, the Russia/Eurasia Center conducts research and organizes debates on Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. Its goal is to understand and anticipate the evolution of this complex and rapidly changing geographical area in order to enrich public discourse in France and Europe and to assist in strategic, political, and economic decision-making.
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