From 'Looking' to Engaging: India and East Asia
The Look East policy (LEP), launched in the early 1990s, was intended to engage India more closely with the East Asian region, but it met with only limited success initially, for India was not seen to be a major contributor either to regional security or economic development.
Superpower military withdrawal, China’s increasing assertiveness, and the unexpected emergence of the South China Sea as a major security issue encouraged some Southeast Asian countries to look again at India. With the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the focus, New Delhi managed to become a member of most regional multilateral initiatives and gradually strengthened bilateral ties with various countries.
Backed by a stupendous economic performance, India’s engagement with East Asia began to undergo a major transformation in the early 2000s. The LEP has evolved into a multi-faceted policy encompassing the entire region, comprising political, economic and strategic dimensions.
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From 'Looking' to Engaging: India and East Asia
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