The Vectors and Means of Rwanda’s Growing External Influence under Paul Kagame
For three decades, Paul Kagame’s Rwanda has pursued a foreign policy aimed at increasing investment in the national economy, maximizing military cooperation and intelligence sharing, and promoting a model of post-genocide state reconstruction.
Rwanda’s diplomatic network has expanded significantly, in contrast to most major African economies, which have reduced their overseas missions and the number of their diplomats because of rising internal crises and budgetary constraints.
While Rwanda’s influence relies on a conventional diplomatic apparatus, it is also supported by other channels such as external intelligence services, as well as state agencies responsible for enhancing the country’s attractiveness, including the Rwanda Development Board (RDB)—which also oversees sports diplomacy—and the Rwanda Cooperation Initiative, under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The strength of the Rwandan army further allows the country to position itself as an indispensable partner for certain extra-African powers, as illustrated by its peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic and the deployment, since 2021, of its forces in northern Mozambique, securing the development of major liquefied natural gas projects operated by some of the world’s largest multinational energy companies.
Available in:
Themes and regions
ISBN / ISSN
Share
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
The Vectors and Means of Rwanda’s Growing External Influence under Paul Kagame
From Africa to Ukraine: An Investigation into African Prisoners of War
When T. W. received an invitation letter to travel to Russia in November 2025, he could hardly believe it. Two months earlier, he had met a young Russian woman who was ill at the hospital in Kampala where he worked as a nurse. After she returned to Russia, they had kept in touch through social media. Much to his surprise, she invited him to come and study and work in her country, even offering to pay for his plane ticket. Delighted by the opportunity, T. W. left without informing either his family or his employer.
Russia’s Policy of Recruiting Fighters and Female Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa
The Russo-Ukrainian war, which began on February 24, 2022, quickly became internationalized. Russia and Ukraine were both quick to mobilize their allies in order to secure political and diplomatic support, as well as military and economic resources. But both belligerents also sought to recruit foreigners on a private basis to support their respective war efforts. This policy is global, extending from Latin America to the Far East. Sub-Saharan Africa, in this landscape, is of particular interest because it constitutes a vast and easily accessible recruitment pool, owing to high poverty rates in most countries of the region combined with a strong desire to emigrate.
Sudan Wartime Online Propaganda
In the Sudan conflict, the propaganda battle between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on mainstream and social media makes it hard to distinguish real, false, and manipulated information. Furthermore, the lack of field press coverage allows fake and misleading news to spread more easily. Although the SAF and RSF work hard to shape the war narrative by building large supporter networks and using various methods such as disinformation and censorship, it is clear they no longer fully control the flow of information. Social media analysis shows that Sudanese politicians, military figures, influencers, and followers weave a tangled web of exchanges filled with rivalries, lies, and propaganda.
Gabon: Has an — Almost — Exemplary Transition Produced a New Political Model?
In two rounds of voting, on September 27 and October 11, 2025, the citizens of Gabon elected the members of both their local councils and the new national assembly. This marked almost the final stage of political transition, little more than two years after the coup d’état that had overthrown the more than five decades old dynastic regime of the Bongos — Omar, the father, who died in office in 2009, and then his son Ali, who is now in exile.