After Barkhane: Rethinking France’s Strategic Posture in West Africa
While building a solid combat partnership with local forces was at the heart of French strategy, the tricolor flag is leaving Mali in a context of diplomatic rupture and unequivocal progress of Russian influence in the country. At the same time, the outbreak of war in Ukraine transformed the European geopolitical landscape, unavoidably questioning France's expeditionary posture and its efforts to Europeanize the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Finally, the jihadi threat continues to progress, gradually making its way to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea where the key French political, economic and security interests in the region are located.
This evolution makes it even more urgent for France to adapt its military and strategic posture in the entire region. It must first aim to redefine its ambitions and objectives, with a clear appreciation of the resources that can be devoted to them. Finally, it must lead to a global and coherent adaptation of its system.
This content is available in French: "Après Barkhane : repenser la posture stratégique française en Afrique de l’Ouest".
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