Russian Military Manpower After Two and a Half Years of War in Ukraine
In addition to a military victory in Ukraine, the Russian leadership is planning to build up sizable troop formations for a possible conflict with NATO in the Baltic region and the Kola Peninsula. In particular, current plans aim for the military manpower to grow by about 350,000, reaching a total of 1.5 million soldiers and commanders. In the context of the current conflict in Ukraine, this cannot be accomplished without a new wave of mass mobilization.
The irrecoverable personnel losses per month of about 30,000 soldiers in 2024 are about equivalent to the influx of contract soldiers and volunteers, constituting the combat-capable core of the Russian military manpower over the same period. In turn, the implementation of this new wave of mobilization is being postponed due to the Kremlin’s concerns about potentially negative domestic political consequences, as well as the lack of command personnel and weapons for new units. By and large, the longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more the Russian military machine deteriorates. Consequently, by providing Ukraine with the necessary assistance to continue the war, the West is weakening Russia’s military potential and increasing the time required for it to recover its armed forces after the war. Yet, the pressure of the war on Ukrainian society and its political system may cause a political crisis with unpredictable domestic and international outcomes.
Dr. Yury Fedorov is a PhD-holding author and expert on Russian Politics and Military Affairs. He worked at the Institute for US and Canada Studies and the Institute for World Economy and International Affairs, both based in Moscow. He spent several years teaching at the Moscow Institute for International Relations as a Professor. After leaving Russia in 2006, Yury Fedorov has lived in Europe, where he began by serving as a researcher at Chatham House in the United Kingdom. Since 2008, he has worked as a journalist in the Czech Republic. He is a member of the Czech Republic’s Syndicate of Journalists and author of the Radio Svoboda Russian Service. His recent publications include his last book, The Ukrainian Front of the Third World War (2024).
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Russian Military Manpower After Two and a Half Years of War in Ukraine
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