Burdensharing in NATO. 3. The German Perception
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful political-military alliance in modern history. Despite doom prophecies of a superfluous NATO having lost its raison d'être, the Alliance is more active than ever before. The reason for NATO's success as the central element of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is its fundamental evolution which has taken place over the past ten years.
NATO's adaptation to new realities has almost inevitably touched the question of how to share costs and benefits among the members of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic. The question of burdensharing is of particular importance with regard to Germany, since unification has fundamentally changed the size, the domestic setting and the international weight of this country. This has necessitated an essential readjustment of German policies and politics in the field of international relations -a process which has still not come to an end. It also required Germany's allies and neighbors to continuously adapt or correct their judgements and misperceptions on German intentions and strategies.
Notwithstanding Germany's ongoing efforts to demonstrate continuity in the essentials of German foreign policy (i. e. Western orientation, European integration, transatlantic partnership, federalism etc.) there was always some mistrust that the new 'Berlin Republic' might return to old patterns of over-assertiveness or 'Schaukelpolitik' (seesaw policy) between East and West. This in turn had raised the question of whether Germany in future will be ready to contribute a fair share to security and stability in Europe and beyond.
This article takes up the issue of burden-sharing in NATO's post Cold War environment from a German point of view. First, it touches briefly on the history of the burden-sharing debate in NATO to prepare the ground for the description of continuity and change. A second part deals with the present discussion on burden-sharing and gives an assessment of the German contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. A third step is focused on the analysis of some future burden-sharing issues which are likely to create irritations and frictions between Germany and the United States, and in general between Europe and America, in the coming years.
Karl Heinz Kamp is Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Research Section at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
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Burdensharing in NATO. 3. The German Perception
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