Multiple Launch Rocket Systems Europe’s Long-standing and Enduring Dependence?
The war in Ukraine has underlined the importance of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in modern conflict, especially a war without clear air superiority and hence a reduced potential for air-launched deep strike. In 2022, the European MLRS fleet was split between a variety of Western platforms developed at the end of the Cold War and specialized in precision strikes.
Alongside these were a larger number of Soviet-era legacy systems intended for saturation fire. As these had seen limited use over the previous thirty years of deployed and peacekeeping conflicts, European MLRS capabilities were massively reduced, with most armies keeping minimal capabilities or completely retiring the systems. Most modernization programs were intended to increase their capability, but also to extend their service life, in order to avoid a costly replacement program.
As the few modern MLRS delivered to the Ukrainian armed forces proved themselves to be highly efficient, European armies launched a major rearmament effort during the first half of 2022 in order to restore this neglected capability. As no local solution existed, most armies opted for off-the-shelf purchases of extra-European systems, with limited options: US M142 HIMARS (119 units ordered in January 2026); Israeli PULS (74 units); or South Korean K239 Chunmoo (310 units); three platforms with similar performances and costs. Germany also chose to develop two competing alternatives, in cooperation with extra-European partners: Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall on GMARS, facing Elbit and KNDS Deutschland on EuroPuls. France chose to create its own solution in order to preserve sovereignty over the production and use of its ammunition, through the FLP-T program.
However, this latter long-term project has required an interim purchase in order to facilitate a short-term replacement of the existing MLRS, the service life of which will end by 2027. Besides the three existing options listed above, it appears that France is willing to purchase an Indian MLRS, the Pinaka, potentially introducing a fourth platform to the European market. This choice is somewhat strange, as the Pinaka is a less capable MLRS than the others in terms of range and accuracy. The French Army specifies a required strike capability of up to 150 km, while the Pinaka can barely reach 120 km with ammunition that is still under development. Besides the much-needed European/NATO interoperability aspect, such a choice would strongly undermine the French position on purchasing European weapons for European armies. Though there is yet no new fully European MLRS, introducing another wholly foreign platform with lower capability would certainly weaken French military credibility.
Western multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) were delivered to Ukraine early in the summer of 2022. They proved decisive in the conflict, enabling Ukrainian forces to engage the Russian military apparatus during the reconquest operations of autumn 2022. These successes brought media attention to systems rarely featured in Western inventories and triggered a race among European countries to renovate and replace a capability segment that had fallen into neglect.
In 2022, Europe’s MLRS fleet consisted mainly of platforms inherited or derived from weapon systems used by Warsaw Pact armies, such as the BM-21 Grad of the 1960s (whose main 122-millimeter (mm) caliber was designed for saturation strikes), alongside a minority of systems of US origin derived from the M270 MLRS program of the 1980s. Although these platforms have now seen forty to fifty years of service and undergone several modernization cycles, European armies long ignored the question of their replacement—until the war in Ukraine brought the issue to a head. The European defense industry as a whole, however, lacks experience in this segment. Saturation systems are relatively well mastered, especially by the former Warsaw Pact countries, but long-range precision surface-to-surface munitions remain largely absent from the continent’s industrial catalogs or depend on restrictive external licenses.
France is no exception. Its MLRS capability has been reduced to a handful of aging platforms with limited availability, and whose munitions depend on US licenses. Paris recently decided to begin development of a new national system to ensure sovereign control over its ammunition supply, which is the only truly strategic component of an MLRS. Developing a national system will be a protracted process, however, and it may leave France isolated within Europe, since most other European armies have opted for quick, off-the-shelf acquisitions of extra-European platforms.
Strategic-level systems with a range exceeding 500 kilometers (km) will not be addressed in this note.
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Multiple Launch Rocket Systems Europe’s Long-standing and Enduring Dependence?
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