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Autonomous Systems in the Underwater Domain: A Limitless Revolution?

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Focus Stratégique
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Autonomous Systems in the Underwater Domain
Accroche

One of the decisive strategic factors in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war is the mass use of aerial, maritime, and terrestrial autonomous capabilities, which are transforming the face of the battlefield. Nevertheless, many of these drones are still remotely piloted, operated, or supervised, testifying to the fact that the autonomization of military capabilities is still at an embryonic stage.

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Ocean drone demonstrator
Ocean drone demonstrator
© Naval Group
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Drones are not a novelty in the naval domain. The US Navy’s first attempts to use aerial kamikaze drones came during the First World War, when the German armed forces also used remotely operated kamikaze boats against British ships. The US Navy started developing fully operational underwater drones in the 1950s. In recent decades, numerous Western navies have deployed remotely operated underwater vehicles on mine warfare operations, primarily to reduce the risk posed to clearance divers. Ukraine’s Magura surface drones,2 among others, are the worthy modern heirs to over a century of naval engagement with unmanned vehicles.

The underwater domain has historically been a driver of innovation in the field of unmanned vehicles because of the difficulty for human beings to operate underwater at great depth or for prolonged periods. Underwater gliders, the first autonomous underwater vehicles, appeared in the 1990s, and the quest for ever greater autonomization in the underwater domain has continued ever since. But this search has always been constrained by the limitations of the underwater environment: opacity, non-homogeneity, water pressure, and salinity.

Spurred by the wave of enthusiasm around the possibilities opened up by the advent of aerial drones, a prolific and diverse range of naval drones has emerged, particularly underwater drones. This trend is largely being driven by industrial actors, who foresee a potential new revolution comparable to that of the aerial drone industry and have no intention of missing out on market opportunities, even if they have to fund a large part of the development costs themselves. 

This proliferation of new drones relies on the increasing commercial availability of standardized dual-use components, which have become significantly cheaper: electric motors and batteries, optic and acoustic sensors, and on-board electronics more generally. It also capitalizes on the industry’s decades of experience in the development of torpedoes and underwater robots and drones, as well as several advances in the relevant technology sectors. In this regard, these new products are as much original developments as they are aggregates of external standardized components. 

How should navies position themselves with regard to this flourishing and increasingly diverse technological offering? Given recent technological developments that herald greater autonomy in the future, how can they make sure not to miss out on the “drone revolution” in the underwater domain? 

The answer to this question requires both an intimate understanding of the constraints of the underwater environment and a realistic picture of autonomy in this domain. These are addressed in the first section of this report. 

Next, it calls for an interrogation of the contexts in which autonomous underwater vehicles are used during military operations, and the choices that these entail. The second section focuses on these considerations. 

Finally, these choices require every navy to define an operational concept that is suited to its autonomous underwater capabilities and to determine how best to integrate the latter into its force structure, which is where any potential revolution will take place. These questions are discussed in the final section.
 

 

 

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Autonomous Systems in the Underwater Domain: A Limitless Revolution?

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Author(s)
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Guillaume Furgolle

Guillaume FURGOLLE

Intitulé du poste

Military Fellow, Defense Research Unit of the Security Studies Center, Ifri

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 A soldier watching a sunset on an armored infantry fighting vehicle
Security Studies Center
Accroche centre

Heir to a tradition dating back to the founding of Ifri, the Security Studies Center provides public and private decision-makers as well as the general public with the keys to understanding power relations and contemporary modes of conflict as well as those to come. Through its positioning at the juncture of politics and operations, the credibility of its civil-military team and the wide distribution of its publications in French and English, the Center for Security Studies constitutes in the French landscape of think tanks a unique center of research and influence on the national and international defense debate.

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French soldiers during an exercise in the forest
Defense Research Unit
Accroche centre

The Defense Research Unit is a program that aims at stimulating the strategic debate by dealing with subjects at the junction of the “technico-operational” and the “political-strategic”. A unique structure in France, it brings together civilian researchers and “military fellows” from each of the three armies to produce work on defense policies, the capability and strategic adaptation of armies, and foresight on tomorrow's conflicts.

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Multiple Launch Rocket Systems Europe’s Long-standing and Enduring Dependence?

Date de publication
10 February 2026
Accroche

The war in Ukraine has underlined the importance of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in modern conflict, especially a war without clear air superiority and hence a reduced potential for air-launched deep strike. In 2022, the European MLRS fleet was split between a variety of Western platforms developed at the end of the Cold War and specialized in precision strikes.
 

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France has a new nuclear doctrine of ‘forward deterrence’ for Europe. What does it mean?

Date de publication
05 March 2026
Accroche

On Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech on France’s nuclear deterrence at the Île Longue naval base near Brest in Brittany, which hosts the country’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. Such addresses are a well-established presidential ritual, typically delivered once per presidential term and receiving moderate attention. This one, however, was highly anticipated in France and abroad, given the profound geopolitical shifts since Macron’s first nuclear speech in February 2020.

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Bundeswehr: From Zeitenwende (historic turning point) to Epochenbruch (epochal shift)

Date de publication
25 February 2026
Accroche

The Zeitenwende (historic turning point) announced by Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022, is shifting into high gear. Financially supported by the March 2025 reform of Germany’s “debt break” and backed by a broad political and societal consensus to strengthen and modernize the Bundeswehr, Germany's military capabilities are set to rapidly increase over the coming years. Expected to assume a central role in the defense of the European continent in the context of changing transatlantic relations, Berlin’s military-political position on the continent is being radically transformed. 

Johanna MÖHRING
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Main Battle Tank: Obsolescence or Renaissance?

Date de publication
17 November 2025
Accroche

Since February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian forces combined have lost more than 5,000 battle tanks, a much higher volume than all the European armor combined. Spearhead of the Soviet doctrine from which the two belligerents came, tanks were deployed in large numbers from the first day and proved to be a prime target for UAVs that became more numerous and efficient over the months. The large number of UAV strike videos against tanks has also led a certain number of observers to conclude, once again, that armor is obsolete on a modern battlefield. This approach must, however, be nuanced by a deeper study of the losses and their origin, UAVs rarely being the sole origin of the loss itself, often caused by a combination of factors such as mines, artillery or other anti-tank weapons.

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Ocean drone demonstrator
© Naval Group

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Autonomous Systems in the Underwater Domain: A Limitless Revolution?