The Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum announced by the United States in March would, if applied, have little direct impact on the French economy, but rather point toward a broader trend of protectionism and economic nationalism and a widening gap in transatlantic relations that is likely to have far-reaching implications for France.

In light of the current instability on Europe’s borders and uncertainties about the international role of the US under the administration of President Donald Trump, it is high time for Franco-German foreign policy initiatives. With the formation of a new German government, a window of opportunity opens for new joint action by the two countries at the core of the EU. At the same time, differences between France and Germany, both on policy issues and in terms of their strategic cultures, could impede any such cooperation. 

In 2016, the European Union issued its Global Strategy, the Union’s latest foreign and security policy strategy document. The strategy “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union”. American policymakers’ feelings about these aspirations are, to say the least, mixed. Several U.S. officials have expressed fear that a strategically autonomous Europe would be detrimental to the transatlantic alliance.

Transatlantic differences over the future of the Iran nuclear deal – or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 – are damaging a nuclear accord that all parties, except the United States, see as delivering on its purpose. They also increase the risk of Washington and European capitals working at cross-purposes vis-à-vis Iran and broader regional policies. To avoid such a scenario, the E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom)/European Union (EU) and the United States need to set up new channels of communication to avoid a transatlantic rift, to attempt – if at all possible – to preserve the Iran deal, and to secure its benefits for regional and global security.