Overwhelmed: Germany’s Israel Policy after October 7th
Few countries have been as profoundly affected by the attacks of October 7th and the subsequent Gaza war as Germany. This is not merely a political controversy. It reflects a deeper structural problem: German-Israel policy has long rested on two guiding principles—a particular historical responsibility toward Israel derived from the Holocaust, and a firm commitment to universalist norms, above all international law and human rights.
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German-Israel policy has long rested on two guiding principles—historical responsibility toward Israel and a commitment to universalist norms—whose tension was managed, but never resolved, through the framework of the two-state solution.
The attacks of October 7th and the subsequent Gaza war did not create this tension, but fundamentally altered the conditions under which it could be managed, effectively overwhelming the established policy framework.
The result has been a pattern of oscillation, deferral, and selective emphasis—visible across in shifting arms deliveries, ambivalent positions on international legal proceedings, the two-state solution, and Germany’s response to regional escalation.
As a result, Germany increasingly maintains its commitments at a declaratory level, avoiding decisions that would clarify how these identity-based principles apply in practice.
Tensions between these principles were long managed through a shared political horizon, most notably the two-state solution—a framework the events of October 7th have profoundly shaken. What has emerged in its place is a pattern of oscillation, selective emphasis, and the postponement of difficult decisions—visible across arms deliveries, international legal proceedings, and responses to regional escalation.
German policy on Israel has long been structured around two guiding principles embedded in the Federal Republic’s post-war identity. On the one hand, there is a particular commitment to Israel derived from the Holocaust, often framed as Staatsräson: Israel’s security forms part of Germany’s raison d’état. As Chancellor Angela Merkel (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, CDU) put it in 2008, “Every federal government and every chancellor before me has been committed to Germany’s special historical responsibility for Israel’s security. This historical responsibility is part of my country’s raison d’état.
This relationship has also been reflexive: Israel became not only an object of foreign policy, but a reference point for Germany’s political self-understanding. In 2018, former Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) chairman Martin Schulz stated: “With the existence of Israel and the recognition of its security, our country symbolizes a definitive departure from the crimes and the mindset of the criminals who plunged our country and the world into misery. (…) In protecting Israel, we protect from the demons of our own people’s past”.
On the other hand, German foreign policy is firmly anchored in universalist norms—above all international law and human rights—which are themselves prominently enshrined in the Grundgesetz (Fundamental Law). German governments have consistently emphasized that their policy toward Israel is embedded in this broader commitment. This also enabled criticism of Israeli policies, including on settlements and Palestinian political rights.
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Overwhelmed: Germany’s Israel Policy after October 7th
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