Du bon usage de la terreur
What is the role of terror in wars in general and in asymmetric conflicts in particular? Why have democratic countries such as France and the United States been confronted to torture in Algeria and Irak? Do terrorists have to be "terrorized"? That article aims at exploring some lines of enquiry in order to answer those particularly sensitive issues.
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Du bon usage de la terreur
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