Les mutations du renseignement militaire : dissiper le brouillard de la guerre ?
Military intelligence has evolved significantly as a result of advanced technology and the changing character of war.
In the 1990s, military intelligence was at the core of the “revolution in military affairs”, carrying the hope that it would help dissipate the fog of war and increase transparency on the battlefield. However, because of the last two decades of military operations, this transformation has proved challenging. Confronted with increasingly complex opponents, Western armed forces have had to adopt the concept of “military interest intelligence”, which widens the scope of its mission. In France, this transformation has borne many questions regarding intelligence organization and capabilities at both the service and joint levels. Given current technological challenges, both for collection and analysis, the future of military intelligence depends, more than ever, upon the amount of human and financial resources political and military leaders choose to allocate to this domain.
This content is available in French : « Les mutations du renseignement militaire : dissiper le brouillard de la guerre ? »
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