Les ressources humaines, un enjeu stratégique pour les armées
The French Military Planning Act for the years 2019-2025, is “dedicated” to men and women in the services, showing how crucial the human factor is for the armed forces.
Nevertheless, due to the specific nature of their missions and commitments, human resources (HR) management in the armed forces is subject to particular constraints, the most obvious of which are the need for youth, high mobility and high availability. While it has been able to meet the challenges of transitioning from a conscription to a professional force, and then of abiding strong deflation policies, the HR model of the French armed forces now has to reverse the trend and endorse a rapid and significant increase in troops number. At the same time, technological changes require a qualitative upgrade in recruits’ profiles. HR managers have to work even harder to control the flow of personnel, weighing on its personnel retention policy while attracting new generations with skills and aspirations different than their elders’.
This content is available in French: Les ressources humaines, un enjeu stratégique pour les armées.
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