Germany re-arms: what does it mean for Europe?
Paris sees risks for its industry and the continent’s sovereignty in Berlin’s rapid defence build-up.
A month after writing on “the perils of German power”, historian Liana Fix received an unusual dinner invitation in Washington.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz was in town in March for talks with Donald Trump and wanted to see the German researcher privately to debate her article, which had taken Berlin by surprise.
In the essay, Fix outlined how her country’s ambitious rearmament plans could go wrong — from industrial competition with countries such as France to a scenario in which the far-right, Russia-friendly Alternative for Germany party used military clout to bully its neighbours.
Germany, she wrote, needed to contain its hegemonic inclinations and find a way to reassure its EU neighbours.
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The military-industrial complex
In Paris, concerns centre on Germany’s industrial might and its reliance on the US and non-European suppliers.
French officials and defence experts warn that Berlin is pursuing a national approach to rebuilding its defence sector while also putting in big orders for US systems, despite pledges to favour European procurement and “strategic autonomy”.
“There was an implicit idea that Germany was the junior partner on military matters — Germany does not want to be the junior partner anymore, on the industrial and strategic levels,” says Johanna Möhring, a researcher at the École Normale Supérieure and the University of Grenoble-Alpes.
Mistrust cuts both ways and leads to industrial competition, according to Paul Maurice, a specialist of Franco-German relations at the Ifri think-tank.
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“There is always scepticism in Germany of French calls for European sovereignty because it is seen as France just promoting its industry,” he says.
French officials do not think the country will be displaced as a leading military power in Europe because it has the nuclear bomb and a seat at the UN Security Council. But Maurice argues that “an influx of so much money will change the face of the European defence industry by increasing the size and reach of German companies”.
French officials do not think the country will be displaced as a leading military power in Europe because it has the nuclear bomb and a seat at the UN Security Council. But Maurice argues that “an influx of so much money will change the face of the European defence industry by increasing the size and reach of German companies”.
Secretary General of the Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa), Ifri
Indeed, the fact that Germany, unlike Britain and France, does not have a costly nuclear deterrent to maintain means that even more money is available for conventional armaments.
The difficulties of joint projects such as the Franco-German Future Combat Air System are a symptom of the strain.
Emboldened by Berlin’s expanded defence budget and a desire to boost domestic knowhow, Airbus’s German-based defence unit has been locked in a dispute over decision-making, workshare and intellectual property with France’s Dassault Aviation on the shared fighter jet, leaving the programme on life support.
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- This article is available on the website of Financial Times. (For subscribers only).
>> >> Read the joint publication by The Cerfa/Security Studies Center of Johanna Möhring "Bundeswehr: From Zeitenwende (historic turning point) to Epochenbruch (epochal shift)". Ifri Papers, Notes du Cerfa, No. 189, February 2026.
>> >> Listen to the podcast featuring Paul Maurice and Johanna Möhring on “Le Collimateur”: « L'Allemagne : le futur géant militaire de l'Europe ? ».
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Paul MAURICE
Secretary General of the Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa), Ifri
