France’s nuclear deterrent, serving first and foremost to defend France’s vital interests, also contributes to the defense of Europe. This contribution has been recognized within the North Atlantic Alliance since 1974, but remains little known. In a speech closely followed by France’s European partners and its adversaries alike, President Emmanuel Macron announced a new concept for French nuclear deterrence: “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée). This article aims to explain the origins of this concept, outline its main pillars, and describe the partnerships that are sought. It then discusses the relationship with the U.S. doctrine of “extended deterrence”, and finally offers some ethical considerations.

Over the past three decades, China’s influence in Central Asia has steadily expanded, but in the last three to five years this process has entered a markedly accelerated phase. Following 2022, Beijing effectively revised both its strategy and its operational approach toward the region.

Since reunification, Germany has built its prosperity on an international order based on free trade, multilateralism, and geopolitical stability. This model relied on three relationships considered complementary: U.S. military protection, Russian energy supplies, and economic integration with China. For several decades, Berlin viewed these interdependencies as factors contributing to peace, growth, and security.

How is Europe navigating China’s ascension as a technological power? The latest report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) provides a nuanced account of a converging, yet still fragmented approach across 22 countries. 

The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis after the Pahalgam attack has generated a familiar but incomplete debate: did nuclear deterrence work, or did it merely allow both sides to fight a limited war under the nuclear shadow? The better answer is that deterrence worked at the level at which it was designed to work. It prevented a general war and an uncontrolled vertical escalation, and kept nuclear weapons in the background. But it did not prevent India from attempting to carve out space for conventional action, nor did it prevent Pakistan from responding conventionally to restore deterrence credibility.

Overall, it was a successful summit for President Macron. However, caution is warranted regarding the 2026 G7’s lasting legacy, as the unpredictability of the U.S. president could affect the durability of commitments made. 

Three and a half years before the scheduled entry into force of the European regulation ReFuelEU Aviation (RFEUA), which requires aviation fuel suppliers at Union airports to offer a sustainable synthetic alternative (e-SAF), no sizeable commercial production unit (greater than 10,000 tons per year) is active within Europe yet, nor has it even passed the Final Investment Decision (FID). Is a major step in the European Union (EU) plans for decarbonizing air transport at risk of not happening, or at least being postponed for several years? Is Europe losing its bet to create a market for e-SAF? Under what conditions can this bet still be won? Could sovereignty and energy security preoccupations unlock necessary public support and help to overcome economic, financial, logistical or administrative obstacles?

Paris has come a long way in its approach to enlarging the European Union. However, French support remains fragile, due in part to a lack of public support.