Current hostilities between the United States, NATO and Russia, though they might not be at Cold War levels, do indicate real danger. NATO’s continued expansion toward the east and the deployment of defensive American antimissiles in Europe constitute serious strategic problems for Moscow.
European strategic autonomy
Europe is faced with a degradation of its security environment, which affects all of the neighboring regional theaters and occurs along the entire conflict spectrum (Russian strategic resurgence, instability and civil wars around the Mediterranean Sea, changing patterns of jihadist terrorism, etc.), and with a growing uncertainty regarding the future commitment to European security of two critical allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. In this context, the European strategic autonomy program established within Ifri’s Security Studies Center provides analytical support to the renewed European interest for defense, and to the attainment of the goal of strategic autonomy, as identified in the EU’s Global Strategy.
Its aims are:
- to provide substance to the concept of “European strategic autonomy” while contributing to the emergence of a European strategic thought on the use of force in the 21st century;
- to add to the ongoing debate on the degree of ambition for European countries in terms of strategic autonomy;
- to assess the capacity, in Europe, to generate military power, now and up to 2030-2040;
- to come up with a comprehensive overview of the existing capacities as well as the lacking areas, as of today and until 2030-2040 (trends, areas and degrees of dependence, etc.);
- to provide recommendations on key lines of effort, in terms of defense investment, operational and industrial cooperation as well as capability development.
War and Democratic Decision Making: How do Democracies Argue and Decide Whether or Not to Intervene in Distant Wars? Editoriaux de l'IFRI
What is the proper place and forum for decisions about war and peace in a democracy? There is surprisingly little consensus on this matter, not in theory and not in practice. While in Iraq, Libya and Syria, all Western actions have ended in failure, it seems necessary to analyze the place and...
Forces terrestres et réassurance : Quelles options pour l'Alliance ? Focus stratégique, No. 65, January 2016
Born into the Cold War, the very notion of ‘reassurance’ was revived in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis as NATO had to label the measures destined to reassert the lasting relevance of collective defense towards its member states.
The Challenges of Maintaining Nuclear Cultures : US and UK perspectives Proliferation Papers, No. 55, January 2016
After the world entered the nuclear age, civilian and military organizations have witnessed the slow emergence of nuclear cultures, defined as the set of values and knowledge, shared among the national security community, about the relative importance of nuclear weapons in the country’s...
Hybrid Warfare in the Strategic Spectrum: an Historical Assessment in Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey Larsen (ed.), NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, Rome, NATO Defence College, 2015, pp. 95-112.
"Hybrid Warfare" is a fashionable concept, but in order fo it to be really relevant, it has to be visualized within the whole strategic spectrum.
Sweden's Nato Workaround: Swedish security and defense policy against the backdrop of Russian revisionism Focus stratégique, No. 64, November 2015
Russia’s revisionist foreign policy and military build-up has considerable security implications for the Baltic Sea region, including for Sweden.
European Defense Planning and the Ukraine Crisis: Two Contrasting Views Focus stratégique, No. 58, June 2015
As the Ukrainian crisis continues, it is now clear that Europe is facing a new strategic environment and needs to adapt.
“Minilateralism”: A New Form of Defense Cooperation Politique étrangère, Vol. 80, No. 1, Spring 2015
Multilateralism has played a significant role in international cooperation.
Differentiated integration, which brings some member states together on common means and strategies, appears to be the only route possible to circumvent obstructions to a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) for the 28 member states.